What is the Political Center and What are the Political Extremes?
What is the political center, and how does it differ from extremes? What defines center-right and center-left? Understanding these distinctions is key to defending freedom and democracy.
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This piece is a translated curated transcription of Episode №4 of the author’s video podcast, published on December 23, 2024, originally in Spanish.
Introduction
Hello, everyone. My name is Jorge Enrique Gómez Pardo, and I am the author of the book “Defensa de la Libertad y de la Democracia: El Centro Político y los Extremos Explicados”. (Defending Freedom and Democracy: The Political Center and the Extremes Explained).
As always, it’s a real pleasure to have you join me for another episode of this vídeo podcast of the same name.
In this, our final episode of the year, we’ll delve into what the political center is and what the extremes are. What we’ll do is provide an updated summary of my book.
Unlike others who approach this topic, often with the intent to label people or create divisions, here we’ll use it as a foundation to better understand the political landscape and its key players. This understanding will help us identify the direction we’re heading in.
In turn, we’ll explore what we can do to contribute to making Colombia a freer, more democratic, safer, and more prosperous country. A nation with a government under the rule of law as strong as possible that enforcing and upholding the law. A fairer Colombia, with greater equality before the law and more equality of opportunity—which necessarily means more and better opportunities for all.
A more united and optimistic Colombia, with more patriotism—patriotism that is simply love for one’s country, without diminishing others—and with stronger and better protections for the most vulnerable.
In doing so, we can help Colombia regain the course that once led it to its best moment, thereby avoiding a dramatic crisis in the coming years—or worse, a long, painful, and senseless decline that would harm the lives and well-being of millions of Colombians, both today and in the future.
As Winston Churchill once wrote,
“Those who are possessed of a definite body of doctrine and of deeply-rooted convictions upon it will be in a much better position to deal with the shifts and surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely taking short views, and indulging their natural impulses as they are evoked by what they read from day to day.”
The characterization of what constitutes the political center and the extremes will be based on the body of doctrine detailed in Defensa de la Libertad y de la Democracia: El Centro Político y los Extremos Explicados.
To write it, I relied on various authoritative sources, including some of the most important thinkers and statesmen of Western civilization, such as Pericles, Winston Churchill, Ronald Reagan, John Locke, Edmund Burke, F.A. Hayek, and Roger Scruton.
The book spans from classical Greece and Rome to the 2022 Colombian presidential campaign. Along the way, it examines key moments in Western history as well as contemporary Colombian and Venezuelan events, providing insights into what has happened in Colombia during President Gustavo Petro’s administration and what might lie ahead for the country during the remainder of his term.
The conceptual ideological map we’ll explore in this episode is also useful for understanding Colombia’s 2026 presidential election.
As is widely known in Colombia, this campaign has been accelerated by the more-than-predictable poor performance of President Gustavo Petro. For instance, many of you might find it surprising how some candidates appear in a “center consultation” poll and then show up in a “right consultation” poll in another.
We’ll analyze the upcoming presidential campaign in greater detail and depth later. The outcome of this election will determine whether Colombia returns to the trajectory that brought it to its peak at the end of the first decade of this century or embarks on a prolonged period of decline, from which it might not recover for decades—if at all.
This is similar to the situations faced, to varying degrees, by dear brother countries like Cuba, Venezuela, or Argentina.
In these dear brother countries, the extremism and left-wing populism have inflicted immense, profound, and unnecessary suffering on tens of millions of decent citizens who want nothing more than to live in peace and have the freedom that grants real opportunities to pursue their dreams and provide for their families.
The conceptual ideological map we’ll discuss in this episode is not limited to understanding Colombia’s internal politics. It is also a valuable tool for placing international leaders in the political spectrum.
Leaders such as the United States’ President Donald Trump, Argentina’s President Javier Milei, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, the UK Conservative Party’s new leader Kemi Badenoch, Madrid’s Community President Isabel Díaz Ayuso, or the Spanish MP and intellectual Cayetana Álvarez de Toledo.
Moreover, it helps frame the perspectives of past presidents and prime ministers like Winston Churchill, Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, or Álvaro Uribe Vélez.
Beyond individual leaders, this conceptual map provides insight into emerging ideas, such as the concepts outlined in the Techno-Optimist Manifesto written by Silicon Valley-based entrepreneur and venture capitalist Marc Andreessen. It also offers clarity in the debates between globalists and anti-globalists.
For the latter, the conceptualization, history, rationale, significance, and fundamental logic of liberal democracy, along with its principles and institutions, prove particularly useful. This is something I explored in-depth in Defensa de la Libertad y de la Democracia: El Centro Político y los Extremos Explicados, particularly regarding the supposed shielding of the Justicia Especial para la Paz (Special Jurisdiction for Peace) (JEP) under the Cooperation Agreement between the International Criminal Court’s Prosecutor’s Office and the Colombian government.
Additionally, this map helps us stay aligned when discussing terms like center-right, center-left, centrism, populism, extreme right, extreme left, and others.
Lastly—and no less importantly—it aims to counteract the narratives and manipulations propagated by certain groups, whether for ideological reasons, purely electoral motivations, or both.
I am fully aware that most people simply don’t have the time to constantly think about or write on these topics. Yet I also know that many are interested—especially in the future of their country.
Therefore, now first, I will introduce you to the flawed and harmful narrative of the so-called “center” and the supposed “extremes,” and the need to combat it with moral courage1, firmness, and solid arguments—especially in a country like ours. This was one of the reasons I wrote the book that serves as the foundation for this video podcast.
Afterward, we will define the political center in a broader sense—or Western Centrality—and the extremes as they are properly understood within this context.
Next, we will explore the nuances of being centrist, right-leaning, or left-leaning within this broader political center or Western Centrality.
Then, we will address Extremismo Progre (Progressive Extremism), which was not identified in my book, published two years ago, but has become evident under the administration of President Gustavo Petro, an extreme left leader.
Following that, we will provide our definition of populism.
Finally, I will present a series of conclusions and closing reflections.
I. The Flawed and Harmful Narrative of the “Center” and the “Extremes”
Let’s now delve into the flawed and harmful narrative of the so-called “center” and the supposed “extremes,” and the need to combat it with moral courage, firmness, and solid arguments.
As I mentioned earlier, this conceptual ideological map is built upon the definitions of the political center and political extremes that I developed in Defensa de la Libertad y de la Democracia: El Centro Político y los Extremos Explicados.
One of the reasons I wrote this book was to challenge a flawed and harmful narrative that gained traction during the 2022 presidential election. This narrative positioned the so-called “center”—which, as we’ll see, is actually the center-left—as the space ranging from classical liberal centrism to democratic left-wing politics. This narrative was very effective in appropriating the concept of the political center in a country like Colombia, which is predominantly centrist.
At the same time, it stigmatized what is conceptually Colombia’s true political center as the “extreme right,” portraying it as part of the “extremes.” Meanwhile, it whitewashed Gustavo Petro, presenting him as a normal “progressive” leftist and even as part of the “centerleft.”
This narrative thus implied that Petro wasn’t so bad, that the center-left candidates would always represent the “center,” and that “uribismo” (the political trend led by former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez) was a extreme-right trend impossible to vote for2. All of this ignoring the ideologies, character, and contributions—or damages—of each political group to the country and its institutions.
In doing so, this narrative confused public debate and misled many centrists, who represent the majority of Colombia’s population.
In the first episode of this video podcast and in other writings, I pointed out that one of the reasons Petro ascended to the presidency was precisely this narrative—a scenario I had warned about in my book.
In that same episode, I also noted that various actors are now trying not only to reclaim but to strengthen this narrative.
That said, there is still significant room for optimism in this regard. Former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez has taken the bull by the horns in his recent interventions, effectively confronting the narrative of the “extremes” with intelligence, depth, and originality.
Here, we do what we can with episodes like this one. But having the most prominent voice of the center-right in Colombia—whose reputation is increasingly restored and whose favorability is on the rise—address this issue with the decisiveness and seriousness it demands is genuinely hopeful. Hopefully, more opinion leaders and politicians will join this effort.
Colombia, like all Western countries, generally has about half its population leaning consciously or unconsciously toward the center-right and the other half toward the center-left.
In this framework, I believe Colombia has always been a centrist country which since 2002, due to security challenges and the success of Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s government, has been a centrist country slightly leaning toward the right.
In particular:
As a result of the need for strong governmental authority within the framework of the rule of law to guarantee security, taking into account our challenges with drug trafficking, criminal organizations, and the geographical circumstances in which we live.
At the same time, as a result of effective classical liberal-conservative policies promoting investment and economic growth.
Finally, in conjunction with all the above, through a profound and efficient social policy aimed at equal opportunity and poverty reduction, under an austere and nonbureaucratic government.
A centrist country, slightly leaning to the right, that has internalized the values of the “social” component of the Estado social de derecho (Social Rule of Law State) across practically the entire political spectrum, as established by the 1991 Constitution.
According to the Colombian Constitutional Court, the “social” concept:
“Requires the State to take action to counteract existing social inequalities and to provide everyone with the necessary opportunities to develop their abilities and overcome material hardships.”
The Estado social de derecho is, therefore, a rule of law with a profound social component.
And a centrist country that, for various reasons—many of which we presented in our first episode, including the divisive and absurd narrative of the so-called “center” and “extremes” I referred to earlier—chose the path of extreme left-wing politics with the election of Gustavo Petro.
This narrative, by the way, was actively or passively promoted by sectors of the center-left, which helped him get elected, as I also explained in the first episode.
Now, we will proceed with arguments and with clarity and firmness to define what the political center truly is and what the extremes represent in this context. What I present here, I reiterate, is an updated summary of my book, Defensa de la Libertad y de la Democracia: El Centro Político y los Extremos Explicados.
II. The Political Center in a Broader Sense or Western Centrality and the Political Extremes
Let us begin with the definition of the political center. In my opinion, the political center is classical liberalism. Furthermore, I argue that there is a political center or classical liberalism in a broader sense and a political center or classical liberalism in a stricter sense.
The political center in a broader sense consists of the systems and institutions that guarantee and promote freedom, democracy accompanied by liberty, and private property. This includes liberal democracy, or democratic rule of law, capitalism, and the market economy. The Estado social de derecho (Social Rule of Law State) and the social market economy are contemporary modalities of these systems and institutions.
This classical liberalism in a broader sense, or political center in a broader sense, is also referred to as Western Centrality. Here, I also refer to it as the space of moderation, adapting the concept of the “space of reason” coined by Cayetana Álvarez de Toledo.
Classical liberalism stems from the ideals of the Enlightenment: reason, science, humanism, progress, and peace, as outlined by Steven Pinker in his book Enlightenment Now, a defense of the Enlightenment. Of course, this refers to Enlightenment progress and Enlightenment peace, which are those consistent with the other ideals of the Enlightenment.
The term space of moderation is not used arbitrarily. I like this term not only because, conceptually, it is the opposite of the extremes properly defined for this context, but also because it allows for a sharper communicative contrast between the two concepts. Moderation, in this sense, has nothing to do with timidity, equidistance, or trying to please everyone, as we will see later.
The extremes, as I believe they should be properly defined for this context, are fundamentally the ideologies or systems that oppose freedom, democracy accompanied by liberty, and/or private property, depending on the specific extreme being referenced.
In their most intense forms, the extreme left encompasses communism and socialism, while the extreme right includes fascism and Nazism—a form of fascism.
In both cases, there are authoritarian gray areas, which are also extremist because they fall outside the bounds of Western centrality.
Extremes, when seriously defined, are politically repugnant because they are contrary to freedom, democracy accompanied by liberty, and, in the case of the extreme left, also private property. Alongside life, these are the basic pillars of human dignity, Western centrality, and Western civilization.
Therefore, if there is one thing all extremes, whether left or right, have in common, it is their disdain for liberal democracy, which is, in turn, classical political liberalism and the core of Western centrality.
From the perspective of the history of Western thought, liberal democracy is the midpoint between anarchy, on the one hand, and authoritarianism and arbitrariness—that is, tyranny—on the other. Liberal democracy, in turn, is based on the defense of life, liberty, and private property. And as the classical liberal thinker Milton Friedman noted, liberal democracy “clearly came along with the free market and the development of capitalist institutions”. These capitalist institutions, as the classical liberal thinker F.A. Hayek describes in detail in The Constitution of Liberty and which I attempt to summarize in my book, are grounded in respect for private property. And the free market, as we will also see later, is based on freedom. Therefore, it is logical—or at least reasonable—to conclude that classical liberalism in a broader sense is the political center in a broader sense.
As we have seen before, and as we will see again later, in Colombia, unfortunately, as in other Western countries, sectors of the center-left have abandoned Western centrality for various reasons, at certain times, and in various ways. At the same time, they label as “extremists” or use similar terms such as far right—tacitly branding them as extreme right—those who have defended Western centrality. We will return to this topic later.
Finally, there is another type of left-wing extremism I referenced in the introduction, which I did not identify in my book but which has become evident as a result of President Gustavo Petro’s government. I am referring to Extremismo Progre (Progressive Extremism). Since this type of extremism is better understood after explaining the nuances within Western centrality, which we will address next, we will first examine these nuances and then delve into this additional form of extremism.
III. The Nuances Within Western Centrality
Let us now address the nuances within Western centrality. Within Western centrality—or classical liberalism in a broader sense, or the broader political center, or the space of reason, or the space of moderation—there are fully respectable categories of center, right, and left.
Ultimately, in a context of seriously defined extremes like the one Colombia faces with the extreme left Gustavo Petro, all these categories are nothing more than nuances within the broader political center.
These nuances are significant, with profound and respectable differences, but in the end, they are just nuances because they are united by their respect for freedom, democracy accompanied by liberty, and private property.
One of these nuances is the political center in a stricter sense, or classical liberalism in its most direct form. The political center in a stricter sense is as respectable as democratic right and left, which in no case can be labeled as extremes if they fall within Western centrality or the broader political center.
This is even more true in a context where there is a truly extremist, radically left-wing politician, like President Gustavo Petro.
Now, I have come to the conclusion that the most realistic, practical, and politically and conceptually clear and honest way to group these nuances within Western centrality—without becoming entangled in too many trends, all of which are, of course, very important and respectable—is into center-right and center-left, both with a hyphen. This is based on the assumption that in Colombia, virtually the entire political spectrum shares the objectives of the “social” component of our Estado social de derecho (Social Rule of Law State) that we discussed earlier.
Center-right and center-left are therefore groupings of nuances of right or left within Western centrality, based on the political center in a stricter sense, in Colombia in light of our Estado social de derecho.
From these, I believe it is easier to understand the different nuances, trends, and even new intellectual tendencies like Tecno-Optimists as I mentioned in the introduction.
Each individual, each person, is unique, and each nuance or new trend is often better understood in specific contexts. For this, however, I believe this conceptual framework is a useful starting point.
This conceptual framework—or mental model, or whatever one wishes to call it—along with the distinction between Western centrality, or the broader political center, and the extremes properly understood for this context which we addressed in the previous section, has served as a starting point for me to understand politics and new trends of thought. I hope it will also be helpful to you.
Of course, it can be improved: one evolves, learns new things, refines concepts and perceptions, and new circumstances and trends emerge. But I believe it is fundamentally a good foundation for understanding both national and international politics.
Thus, for the purposes of this episode, it can be said that the center-right, or classical liberal-conservative space, is the space that, in its various nuances and trends, ranges from classical liberalism at the center to democratic conservatism on the right.
Center-right—with a hyphen, I insist—because it unites different nuances and trends.
And the center-left is the space that, in its various nuances and trends, ranges from classical liberalism at the center to traditional left and progressive left.
Center-left also with a hyphen, because it also unites different nuances and trends.
I reiterate that what I have pointed out so far, and what I will point out, is expanded upon, detailed, and substantiated in my book, where perhaps the source I use most frequently is the writings of F. A. Hayek.
This classical liberal thinker, in turn, had a significant intellectual influence on Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Although both are considered conservatives in the Anglo-American sense, they are actually classical liberal conservatives or center-right figures in the terms we will discuss later, always understanding liberals as classical liberals, which is the original sense of the term.
The thought of the conservative philosopher Roger Scruton is also fundamental to what I propose here.
Next, I will first address the political center in a stricter sense. Then, I will discuss democratic conservatism, which, together with the political center in a stricter sense, constitutes the center-right with a hyphen. Finally, I will discuss the democratic left, which, together with that political center in a stricter sense, constitutes the center-left with a hyphen.
A. The Political Center in a Stricter Sense
Let us now move to the political center in a stricter sense. As I mentioned earlier, this is classical liberalism in its strictest sense. If the broader political center, or Western centrality, represents being a classical liberal in a broader sense, then it is logical that being centrist, within the nuances of Western centrality, means being a classical liberal in a stricter sense.
From there, within the framework of Western centrality, the other nuances arise, with some leaning more to the right and others more to the left. These form the center-right and the center-left, both with a hyphen, as we have seen.
The political center in a stricter sense—and this is very important—is also characterized by its firm defense of Western centrality grounded in solid classical liberal political principles that help guide and set the course, especially in times of uncertainty, fanaticism, pettiness, and radicalization. It acts as a compass, pointing the way through this storm of narratives, polls, social media disputes, and extremism.
Consequently, the political center is neither equidistance, nor necessarily the circumstantial consensus of the moment, nor the left, nor timidity.
Classical political liberalism is the liberal democracy (as opposed to illiberal or other forms of democracy). Classical economic liberalism is capitalism and the market economy. And the classical liberal temperament, at least from the perspective of political leadership or those influencing the public agenda, is firm and conviction-driven, yet respectful and tolerant of others’ ideas—as long as they fall within Western centrality. In all circumstances, with moral courage, conviction, and realism, it upholds freedom of expression and fosters pluralism, pragmatism, and the pursuit of consensus within that framework.
And all of this operating in a government under a rule of law as strong as possible, enforcing and upholding the law.
Let us break down each of these points:
Liberal democracy, or democratic rule of law, is essentially a political system whose primary goal is to guarantee the intrinsic and inalienable rights and freedoms of all citizens by limiting state power within a democratic framework.
The intrinsic and inalienable rights and freedoms we all possess simply by being human are life, liberty, and property.
The fundamental logic of this system is to limit state power to prevent arbitrariness and authoritarianism by rulers, which could lead to violations of these intrinsic and inalienable rights and freedoms to which, I reiterate, all citizens are entitled simply by being human.
To achieve this, democratic rule of law relies on a series of principles and institutions, such as equality before the law, the exercise of state power through pre-established norms while respecting due process, the separation of powers, freedom of expression, and respect for the popular will within the framework of these principles of liberal democracy, among others.
It is, therefore, essentially about limiting state power within a democratic framework.
According to the Oxford Dictionary of Economics, capitalism is the economic system based on private property and private enterprise. In this system, all—or a significant portion—of economic activity is carried out by private individuals or organizations seeking profit, and land and other material means of production are largely privately owned.
Continuing with this dictionary, a market economy is an economy in which a substantial proportion of goods is allocated through the use of free markets, where a free market is a market where people buy and sell voluntarily.
The dictionary adds that a market economy contrasts with a planned economy, where the majority of goods are allocated by a centralized decision-making authority.
Consequently, the political center, in a government under the rule of law as strong as possible that enforces and upholds the law, bases all its political actions on freedom, democracy accompanied by liberty, respect for private property, and the realistic—and therefore healthy—equality derived from this: equality before the law and equality of opportunity moving upward.
The center does not seek therefore to make everyone materially equal because that is impossible. It is impossible because all individuals are different and possess varying talents and abilities. What the center seeks, then, are realistic and therefore healthy equalities.
The first is equality before the law. This is based on the principle that all human beings, without any distinction, are intrinsically equal, and therefore, all have a set of intrinsic and inalienable rights and freedoms, as I mentioned before.
As we also discussed, from the classical liberal perspective, these are life, liberty, and property, whose guarantee is the primary—though not the only—responsibility of any liberal democracy.
The second healthy equality to aspire to is equality of opportunity moving upward. This is why the center is tremendously active, and above all, effective in implementing broad and deep policies in education, healthcare, poverty reduction, and other social or infrastructure policies.
And this within the framework of Western centrality, supported by high, consistent, and healthy economic growth as a result of the greatest possible economic freedom. This freedom is humanistic in itself and serves as the source of resources for policies that foster equality of opportunity moving upward.
The center, therefore, defends and promotes living in a government under a democratic rule of law as strong as possible, where everyone has more and better opportunities to move forward.
Since the center seeks a government, under a democratic rule of law, that is as strong as possible, it is neither anarchic in economic matters nor in security, nor is it unnecessarily interventionist in the economy. Therefore, being centrist is not the same as being leftist.
Thus, since the center is about freedom, advocating for the greatest possible economic freedom—and therefore the least possible state interference in the economy—is also central to being centrist.
I emphasize the word “possible”, which is not the same as no intervention. In classical economic liberalism, it is not that there is no state intervention through, for example, taxes and regulations in various areas, such as those that ensure free competition and, therefore, the market economy. Rather, it is about the least possible intervention.
And when the state does intervene, it does so effectively, precisely to guarantee economic freedom or, within this framework, to protect other rights, such as consumer rights.
For example, as Hayek points out:
“There is, in particular, all the difference between deliberately creating a system within which competition will work as beneficially as possible and passively accepting institutions as they are.”
It is a classical liberal mindset, whether instinctive, learned, or a combination of both to varying degrees, that understands either or both ideologically and realistically the intrinsic incentives of free-market capitalism. This mindset manifests itself, among other things, in the exercise of state functions.
Thus, it seeks the greatest possible economic freedom for businesses and individuals to use their money, energy, and time as they see fit and, ultimately, to achieve their dreams.
For this reason, classical liberal centrism is always working to reduce fiscal, regulatory, and bureaucratic burdens. That is why the center also consistently promotes initiatives to foster more and better businesses. And that is why the center always works to create the best possible environment for doing business in a country.
In short, the center, as understood here, systematically seeks to create the most favorable conditions possible for entrepreneurs, established business owners, employees, and freelancers to fulfill their dreams and life projects. Ultimately, I reiterate, to achieve their dreams and ensure their families’ well-being.
The center, in turn, implements the firmest security policies within the framework of the rule of law, precisely to guarantee the aforementioned rights and freedoms to all citizens, without distinction.
Being centrist is, therefore, also about being as firm on security as necessary to ensure the practical existence of the liberal order in the broader sense. To achieve—and I never tire of repeating it—a government under a rule of law that is as strong as possible, enforcing and upholding the law.
As Winston Churchill once wrote:
“A constitutional government, to be worthy of the name, must prove itself capable of preserving law and order, and protecting life, freedom and property. If it fails to enforce these fundamental guarantees, no parliamentary system can endure.”
Colombia’s reality in terms of public order, as a result of the historical weakness of the Colombian state, drug trafficking, the number and capability of criminal organizations, and the geographical circumstances in which we live, demands unyielding firmness in security—always within the framework of the rule of law—accompanied by highly effective economic and social growth policies.
Thus, the freedom and the realistic and healthy equality that the center seeks for all men and women, without distinction, are only possible in a government under the rule of law that is as strong as possible, where there is both freedom and order, as stated on our national coat of arms.
Without order, there is no freedom. And there can be no order, and therefore freedom, without security. Hence, defending security, with all the firmness required by the circumstances—always within the framework of the rule of law—is what also means to be centrist.
And all of this, in Colombia, in conjunction with the social objectives of the Estado social de derecho (Social Rule of Law State) that we discussed earlier.
Now, given that liberal democracy and free-market capitalism—freedom and democracy as a whole—are always under constant siege by all kinds of extremists and demagogues, being centrist, especially from a position of political leadership, cannot mean being timid, complacent, or opportunistic.
If the broader political center is not defended with moral courage and firmness, extremists, with the complicity of radicals, the timid, the complacent, and the opportunistic, will destroy it. And with it, the possibility of living in a free, open, pluralistic, and tolerant society.
I reiterate that extremists have always existed and will always exist, whether on the left or the right. What matters, then—the morally correct and politically appropriate action—is for the moderate sectors of various tendencies to unite in defense of Western centrality.
Therefore, the center is also the firm, coherent, and unwavering defense of life, freedom, democracy accompanied by liberty, and private property. In doing so, it defends liberal democracy, capitalism, and the market economy—that is, the institutions of centrality designed to guarantee them.
Any centrist policy must, therefore, be grounded in the guarantee and defense of these institutions and the principles and values that underlie them.
In addition to life, liberty, and property, these include equality before the law, the separation of powers, adherence to pre-established norms, freedom of expression, respect for democratic principles, the greatest possible economic freedom—with the least possible political and regulatory interference by the state in the economy—and equality of opportunity, as discussed earlier.
To be classical liberal, a centrist, is, therefore, to be based on solid political principles, to be absolutely firm in defending classical liberalism and consistently protecting its institutions and the principles and values underlying it from the threats posed by left-wing, right-wing, and even establishment-driven extremism. Yes, establishment-driven extremism.
This last point has manifested over the past decade or so, particularly from the center-left establishment in various forms and across different countries, including Colombia.
Thus, in a scenario unimaginable until recently, the so-called “extremes”—that is, the center-right, as viewed by certain center-left and extreme-left sectors—have had to step up to defend the political center, sometimes with the crucial support of notable centrists from the establishment or elites, counter-elites, or however one wishes to describe them, from the center-left.
I am referring to cases such as Elon Musk, Bari Weiss, Marc Andreessen, or Joe Rogan in the United States; J.K. Rowling in the United Kingdom; or Professor Fernando Savater in Spain.
In Colombia, unfortunately, this battle has been fought primarily by the center-right. However, it must be acknowledged that, albeit belatedly (much later than ideal), some center-left sectors have joined the fight since the beginning of Petro's administration, althoug many of them help him to get elected.
That said, it is fair to recognize the self-reflection taken in the right direction by El Espectador (center-left) two years ago, in an editorial titled “¡Nada de dogmas! Celebramos el cambio de opinión” (“No Dogmas! We Celebrate Changing Opinions”) regarding its stance during the 2016 plebiscite on the peace process between former President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC:
“In the frenzy of daily life, in the need to comment on the go to keep up with a frantic country, we lose spaces for reflection, for recognizing mistakes, and for identifying changes in our perspectives.
Perhaps the most important example in recent history is what happened during the 2016 plebiscite.
At El Espectador, particularly in this editorial space, we allowed ourselves to be blinded by the promise of peace, by the euphoria of turning the page, and in that process, we lost the ability to gauge the nation's mood.
We took the victory of the 'Yes' for granted, the superiority of the arguments in favor of the agreement, and we did not give opposing voices, concerned about concessions, the space they deserved.
When the majority of the country said 'No,' a self-reflection was necessary. We changed our opinion: we continued to support peace, of course, but it was necessary to identify the weaknesses in our arguments and to see the Colombia we had overlooked. That lesson has stayed with us in the years since.”
Being centrist, therefore, does not mean being equidistant either. Was the fascist Mussolini centrist because he stood somewhere between Hitler’s Nazi fascism and Churchill’s conservative liberalism?
As Isabel Díaz Ayuso points out:
"Firmness is not extremism," and "we must take a stand on things." (...) "Silence and equidistance are not moderation because there are silences complicit with terror, with abuse, with tyranny."
Therefore, it is not about being equidistant between Petro’s neo-communism and the center-right, including uribismo, nor any other kind of equidistance, including equidistance between two candidates, regardless of their ideological platforms, temperaments, or political parties.
The center will always, in all circumstances, mean being fundamentally classical liberal.
What happens is that, for the left, anything that isn’t left is right. Evidently, if someone is a classical liberal centrist, they are to the right of the left. But that does not necessarily make them right-wing, let alone an “extreme” right-winger. At the very least, they are centrist, and to the left be the left.
Being centrist, therefore, is not, I reiterate, about being left-wing.
Indeed, as the conservative thinker Roger Scruton notes:
“Anyone who defends the classical liberal position is likely to be regarded, now, as a conservative, on account of the association between classical liberalism and the free market.”
Thus, this thinker adds, for the left—whether in Colombia it disguises itself as the “center” or in the Anglo-American world as “liberalism”—”that, to the extent that you are not on the left, to that extent you are on the right.”
It is within this context that the classical liberal thinker Milton Friedman pointed to the:
“Corruption of the term liberalism, [whereby] the views that formerly went under that name are now often labeled conservatism.”
And as we have also seen, this context has parallels in Colombia, where the center-left has sought to appropriate the center through a series of myths that I analyze in the book, and has attempted to label uribismo as an “extreme” equivalent to petrismo (the political trend led by sitting President Gustavo Petro).
And this is in the cases where this is ideologically driven. In others, it is mere electoral opportunism to unjustly appropriate the “center” in a centrist country. Meanwhile, as incredible as it may seem, they attempt to label as “extremists” those who have defended Western centrality in Colombia with courage, consistency, and perseverance over the past 25 years, in all circumstances.
The center, therefore, is not necessarily the consensus at a given moment.
Or does the extreme left and the center-left, which has promoted the absurd narrative of the "center" and the "extremes," consider former President Uribe centrist when he was president and his favorability consistently exceeded 80% several times and never dropped below 68%, as noted in a recently published book by the Universidad de los Andes?
By the way, as I detail in my book, this is one of the cases where the center aligned with the consensus and remained the center even after it ceased to be the consensus.
Recently, we have seen some attempting to justify this clearly, I reiterate, conceptually flawed narrative of the so-called "center" by claiming that this has been the historical understanding of the center in Colombia. As if it were so since the times of General Santander.
As far as I recall, former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez (center-right) raised this issue at least as early as 2012 when he published his autobiography. Former President Iván Duque (also center-right) published a book in 2018 titled El futuro está en el Centro (The Future Lies in the Center). And Sergio Fajardo (center-left, though more left-leaning than centrist, as evidenced, among other things, by his support for Petro and Ocampo's leftist tax reform) used the term "center" during his first presidential campaign in 2010, nearly 25 years ago.
Identifying oneself as centrist or as being part of the center is, of course, legitimate—just as legitimate as identifying oneself as right-wing or left-wing.
The difference is that in these cases—even to Fajardo’s credit at the time, based on the information I have—they did not seek to label the center-right or the center-left as “extremes,” implicitly branding them as extreme-right or extreme-left. Nor did they equate them as comparable “extremes” alongside true extremists, as is the case with Gustavo Petro’s extreme left.
The truth, however, is that this absurd and divisive narrative began to have real political effects during the last presidential campaign when it was promoted by figures from the center-left and sectors of the sympathetic press.
These real effects were highly negative, as all Colombians are suffering today with the election of the current President.
As I mentioned earlier, one of the reasons that led me to write the book that doctrinally supports this video podcast was to provide conceptual tools to counteract this narrative. This is why the book is titled “Defensa de la Libertad y de la Democracia” (“Defense of Freedom and Democracy”) and subtitled “El Centro Político y los Extremos Explicados” (“The Political Center and the Extremes Explained.”).
Yet, alongside with the moral courage and firmness to stand for classical liberal principles, values, and institutions in all circumstances, being centrist also means being respectful and tolerant of others’ ideas within the framework of Western centrality. Logically, therefore, being centrist does not mean lacking convictions or timidity.
The center, therefore, rejects any form of extremism, totalitarianism, or cancel culture.
In this sense, the centrist temperament is ultimately summarized by the famous quote often attributed to Voltaire:
“I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it”.
The classical liberal is aware of both the light and the shadows of human nature.
They are also a humanist who believes in the intrinsic equality of all human beings, the consequent equality before the law, and meritocracy, which expands and deepens the greater the economic freedom and equality of upward opportunities.
And all of this with an open, optimistic, and pragmatic attitude toward life, change, and progress.
The center is also about flexibility, open-mindedness, and embracing the natural and desirable changes and reforms of any free society that progresses. Always grounded in, I reiterate, the firmest defense of classical liberal principles, values, and institutions.
The center, therefore, rejects any form of extremism in pursuing change, especially when it is violent.
The center rejects any form of violence because it is a matter of basic common sense, as it violates the intrinsic and inalienable rights to which all citizens are entitled, and because it undermines, in practice, Western centrality or moderation.
The classical liberal temperament, the centrist temperament, is therefore one of moral courage, firmness, and conviction, as well as respect, moderation, pragmatism, optimism, and dialogue—always based on the political principles that allow us to live in a free society where everyone can follow what they feel and believe.
A society characterized by respect and tolerance for people with values different from their own—one that does not seek to impose its own values on others, whether those values are more classically liberal, more conservative, or more left-leaning in certain cases.
The center is, ultimately, grounded in a government under the rule of law that is as strong as possible, enforcing and upholding the law, basing all political actions on solid classical liberal political principles, in freedom, democracy accompanied by liberty, respect for private property, and the realistic and healthy equality derived from these: equality before the law and equality of opportunity moving upward.
The greatest possible economic freedom. Deep and meaningful social policies. And the most determined and resolute security policies within the framework of the rule of law.
A temperament that is simultaneously open, tolerant, democratic, pluralistic, inclusive, optimistic, reformist, flexible, dialogical, and non-sectarian on the one hand, and on the other, firm in the defense of freedom and democracy in all circumstances. Especially when they are most threatened, precisely to ensure that we can continue living within the Wester centrality and away from any extremism.
It is, ultimately, about liberty and order, as proclaimed by the motto on our national coat of arms. This national symbol, a heritage and unifying factor for all Colombians since the origins of the Republic in the times of General Santander, encapsulates the liberal nature in the broader sense of Colombia and its people—a Colombia where all nuances within Western centrality are welcome.
B. Center-Right / Democratic Right
Let us now discuss the democratic right. As we saw earlier, the center-right and center-left—both with a hyphen—are political spaces within Western centrality or the broader political center, leaning either to the right or the left, starting from the stricter political center we just examined. And in Colombia, these spaces are also interpreted through the lens of the values embodied in the “social” concept of our Estado social de derecho (Social Rule of Law State).
As we also noted, the center-right—or the classical liberal conservative space—encompasses a range of nuances and trends, spanning from classical liberalism at the center to democratic conservatism on the right. Similarly, the center-left, with its own range of nuances and trends, spans from classical liberalism to the traditional left and the democratic progressive left.
The democratic right, or conservatives, is often associated with conserving the existing order, as well as with security, authority, order, stability, moderation, and traditions.
Within the context of a real threat to the principles, values, and institutions of the classical liberal order—which in various forms and degrees has been experienced by the West in recent years, including Colombia—classical liberalism, representing the center, and conservatism, representing the right, are far from being mutually exclusive. Instead, they are complementary and, in fact, constitute a single space: the classical liberal conservative space, or the center-right, with a hyphen.
This is because both defend (we defend) essentially the same foundation: the political and economic framework that ensures life, liberty, and property, along with the principles, values, and political and economic institutions designed as a result and to guarantee them, as we have seen.
For example, this includes equality before the law, the separation of powers, freedom of expression, capitalism, the market economy, and respect for the popular will within the framework of these and other principles of Western centrality.
As we have seen—and as we will further explore in the section on the democratic left—the center-left has been deficient in defending this political and economic framework. For this reason, the center-right aligns more closely with the political center than the center-left.
This is true for both conceptual and political reality reasons. Conceptually, because the political center, as we have seen, is about freedom. And the center-right is, by definition, the space that seeks the greatest possible economic freedom.
Politically, in the Colombian context, because some center-right trends have consistently and coherently defended the institutions that guarantee freedom and democracy, as well as the greatest possible economic freedom, throughout this century.
In Colombia, particularly in relation to the institutions of the democratic rule of law designed to guarantee freedom and democracy, we saw this in the events related to the disregard of the 2016 plebiscite results. In some cases, it must be said, with the support or complacency of sectors of the center-right and, of course, with the full backing of the extreme left.
We also saw this in the support that numerous and prominent figures from the center-left gave to Petro—not only during his administration but also to help him become President of the Republic.
Classical Liberals and conservatives in a liberal democracy are, therefore, both classical liberal and conservative —myself included—, especially in the face of extremist risks posed by true extremists or the establishment, whether left-wing or right-wing in both cases.
Following Hayek's views, some may be more to classical liberal (or essentially centrist), others perhaps more conservative (or essentially right-leaning), and even a single individual may lean more classical liberal or more conservative depending on the issue at hand.
But in all these cases, they (we) belong to the same political space: the classical liberal conservative space or the center-right, which, I reiterate, is one within Western centrality or the broader political center.
As the conservative scholar Roger Scruton notes:
“Readers will be aware of all the intricacies here, and it is best to put them aside, simply acknowledging that, in the battle with socialism, the classical liberal and the conservative now stand side by side.”
It should not be surprising, then, that Edmund Burke, widely regarded as the archetype of the Western conservative, is also regarded by Hayek to be one of the three great liberals.
Hence, I reiterate, in Colombia and the rest of the West, classical liberals and conservatives are (we are) one political space: the classical liberal conservative space or the center-right. And this remains true regardless of individual trends or political affinities.
Thus, the center-right, in both its more right-leaning and centrist nuances, focusing on what unites us rather than what divides us, believes in a government under the rule of law that is as strong as possible—one that enforces and upholds the law with the firmest and most decisive security policies, always in accordance with the principles of the rule of law and, consequently, human rights.
A government under the rule of law that is as strong as possible, with the greatest possible freedom of expression, where respect and tolerance for differences prevail, and where legitimate civic differences can be addressed with equality before the law, with respect, and within the framework of democratic rule of law institutions, free from violence and in peace.
A government under a rule of law that is as strong as possible, which, together with the highest level of security and economic freedom, maximizes the incentives inherent in the free-market capitalist system.
This last point includes, among other things, the lowest possible taxes, regulations, and state interventions in the economy, coupled with stability and as austere a state as possible.
A government under a rule of law that is as strong as possible, which, along with everything previously mentioned and with effective, streamlined policies that stimulate investment, entrepreneurship, and social development, fosters greater equality of opportunity—which necessarily means more and better opportunities for all.
A government under a rule of law that is as strong as possible that looks toward the future by building on what has already been achieved, with increased and improved protections for the most vulnerable.
And a government under a rule of law that is as strong as possible, one where there is peace—but peace within the framework of the rule of law, without weakening it, and in no case undermining security, because without security, there is no life, liberty, or property.
The classical liberal conservative space, or the center-right, thus embodies the classical liberal principles and values as well as the conservative values mentioned earlier.
In essence, quoting Ronald Reagan on his political beliefs, this political space seeks:
“The maximum individual freedom consistent with an orderly society.”
And in Colombia’s case, it does so while embracing the social values embedded in the “social” concept of our Estado Social de Derecho (social rule of law state).
C. Center-Left / Democratic Left
Let us now turn to the democratic left. As we’ve mentioned, this group essentially consists of two main factions: the traditional left and the progressive left.
Let’s start with the traditional left. It is typically associated with the pursuit of material equality and excessive state intervention in economic activity. This results in less economic freedom, reflected in higher taxes and regulations, as well as a larger and more expensive state—thus distancing itself from the center.
Alongside the traditional left’s focus on material equality, the democratic left also includes the “progressives,” commonly referred to as progres.
This leftist faction champions causes such as animal rights, environmentalism, feminism, and LGBTI activism. These causes, of course, are not exclusive to the left.
The center and the right also defend them, though often from a more Enlightenment-based perspective aligned with the ideals of the Enlightenment we’ve discussed— and thus in a more classically liberal sense. Liberal, that is, in its original meaning, which is also the most conceptually precise.
The extremist approach of some progressives, however, is precisely what leads us to the concept of Progressive Extremism, which I mentioned earlier and will address in the next section.
In Colombia, moreover, the center-left establishment—along with the extreme left and some sectors of the center-right—both emotionally and politically exploited the aspiration for peace, a sentiment shared by all Colombians, during the peace process with the FARC.
In practice, this peace process weakened security and, consequently, the genuine pacification the country had largely achieved by the end of the first decade of this century.
It also undermined the democratic rule of law. This occurred, among other ways, by overriding the results of the 2016 plebiscite and imposing—without a separation of powers and in co-governance with the FARC—the agreement signed between the administration of former President Juan Manuel Santos and that criminal organization.
In doing so, they not only violated the Constitution and the entire body of Constitutional Court jurisprudence in effect at the time but also the most fundamental principles of liberal democracy, as understood through the history of Western constitutionalism.
They also undermined the significant progress Colombia had achieved in combating total impunity for the most severe human rights violations.
In doing so, they set Colombian society back from the substantial advances achieved through the peace process with the AUC during the government of former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez.
That peace process with that extremist and criminal organization was not only the first conducted under the Rome Statute—which governs the International Criminal Court (ICC)—but it was also carried out under the strictest interpretations of its provisions. The Rome Statute entered into force in 2002, having been signed and ratified by Colombia in 1998 and 2002, respectively. The ICC formally began operating in 2003, and the agreement with the AUC was signed in 2005.
With the peace process involving the AUC, and as noted by the first prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, in his book on his experience in the role:
“Colombia became the best example of ‘positive complementarity.’”
This refers to the principle of complementarity under the Rome Statute and its practical application. It underscores the influence of the ICC Prosecutor’s Office on the efforts made by the Colombian government, Congress, the Constitutional Court, the armed forces, NGOs, and society at large to ensure that the peace process with the AUC, along with the legal framework that supported it—the Justice and Peace Law—were consistent with the Rome Statute.
This law, designed to also apply to peace processes with the FARC and the ELN, was described by former Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo as follows:
“The Justice and Peace Law created a new paradigm combining demobilization with an alternative punishment. It also provided truth and reparations to the victims.'
Finally, sectors of the center-left establishment played a key role in facilitating the rise of the extreme left, led by Gustavo Petro, to the Presidency of the Republic in 2022. Many of these same sectors have participated in his radical administration.
IV. Another Form of Extremism: Progressive Extremism
Let us now turn to Progressive Extremism. This type of extremism pushes animal rights, environmentalist, feminist, or LGBTI activist causes to levels that stray from the ideals of the Enlightenment.
Why does this make them conceptually extremist? Because, as we have seen—and as I elaborate on in greater detail in the book—Western centrality, or classical liberalism in a broader sense, is a result of the ideals of the Enlightenment. And political and economic extremes, when properly defined in this context, are those that deviate from centrality or the broader political center.
Likewise, when the application of these causes departs from those core Enlightenment principles, they too become extreme.
As we noted earlier, according to Professor Steven Pinker, the ideals of the Enlightenment are reason, science, humanism, progress, and peace. Of course, I reiterate, Enlightened progress and Enlightened peace are those that remain consistent with the other ideals of the Enlightenment.
Who can seriously believe that President Gustavo Petro's eco-progressive extremism aligns with the ideals of the Enlightenment? This was evident in his 2024 Davos announcement, where he declared that Colombia would "no longer contract new oil, gas, and coal exploration—hydrocarbons in general—as a demonstration of the necessity to decarbonize our global economy."
Especially when:
Colombia would still need to import these resources, ultimately achieving nothing in terms of reducing global production or decarbonization, as they would simply be extracted elsewhere—while the world, including Colombia, continues to depend on them.
Colombians would face higher energy costs, making daily life more expensive for millions of citizens.
The Colombian state would lose substantial revenues needed to fund essential sectors such as security, healthcare, education, and infrastructure.
In fact, Colombia began importing gas this month for the first time in 45 years.
V. Populism
Let us now turn to populism. Here, we understand populism not as an ideology but as a way of gaining and wielding power—whether from the left, the right, or both at once. It does so by manipulating or exploiting citizens' emotions, turning them against perceived elites, and/or pursuing policies or adopting attitudes that can destabilize a country politically, economically, and socially.
It must be said that opposition to these perceived elites is, at times, entirely justified. In others, it may have varying degrees of justification. And in some cases, it is completely unwarranted.
These elites are not necessarily defined by socioeconomic or intellectual status alone but rather, and perhaps more broadly, by what President Javier Milei calls the “caste.”
That is, individuals in politics, the media, academia, or the private sector—regardless of their background (socioeconomic, intellectual, regional, racial, or ideological)—who exploit their privileges and abusively benefit from the state at the expense of citizens’ interests.
Regarding the idea that populism is not an ideology but rather a way of gaining and exercising power, in Defensa de la Libertad y de la Democracia: El Centro Político y los Extremos Explicados (Defense of Freedom and Democracy: The Political Center and the Extremes Explained), I point out that the Cuban journalist and writer Carlos Alberto Montaner, in a highly important collection of essays edited by Álvaro Vargas-Llosa titled El Estallido del Populismo (The Populist Explosion), argued that populism:
“Is not exactly an ideology but a method for attaining power and staying in it.”
In that sense, I also add that, according to Spanish thinker Cayetana Álvarez de Toledo, in the same collection of essays:
“Populism is not an ideology. It can arise from the right or the left.”
She further explains:
“In Cuba and Venezuela, it arose from the left. In France, from the right. In Greece, from the left. In the United Kingdom, from the right. In Spain, however, it has sprung from both extremes simultaneously. Spanish democracy is a little creature caught in pincers: on one side, Catalan and Basque nationalisms; on the other, the Podemos party.”
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, in her book, defines it as:
“The idea that the role of politics is to please people’s moods, to chase the impulses of the moment, to follow society instead of leading it.”
Based on what we have seen in this episode, populism and extremism are not the same. However, populism can indeed lead to extremism. And, of course, there are those who are both populists and extremists at the same time.
In this regard, in my book, I also cite an essay by the great Venezuelan leader María Corina Machado about Chávez, taken from the same collection, in which she warns:
“Populism is merely the initial practice, one that enables the deployment of multiple tactics used by chavismo to hijack the state and consolidate a horrifying regime far more harmful than the term populist allows us to imagine.”
She adds that on his path to power—that is, before winning the elections—Chávez:
“Went from being a coup-plotting military officer to a consummate demagogue. His discourse was purely populist. He eagerly divided the population between ‘the people’ and ‘rotten elites,’ while threatening to sweep away the corrupt and fry the heads of the Adecos in oil.”
In this regard, María Corina Machado also notes:
“Up until then, we could say that Hugo Chávez embodied the prototype of the most classic populist” because “populism is typically associated with the emergence of a personalist leader who brandishes divisive rhetoric, creating a profound separation between the people and the corrupt elites.”
And once in power, they do not usually seek to unite the country around common and constructive purposes. Instead, they double down on their populist strategy of confrontation—and in the case of left-wing populists, class warfare.
VI. Acknowledgments and Closing Remarks
Well, thank you very much. We have reached the end of this episode, and I want to express my deep gratitude for your attention—not just to this episode, but throughout this entire project.
Today, we explored the conceptual foundations of the political center and the political extremes, applying them to various political trends and figures.
I hope this is useful in helping you better understand—or at least see from a different perspective—the national and international political landscape, its direction, and how to conceptualize your own political inclinations.
And, just as importantly, to avoid being misled by certain political trends and their ideological and opportunistic narratives.
I reiterate that I fully recognize that most people simply do not have the time to constantly reflect on or write about these topics. However, I also know that many are deeply interested—and, above all, genuinely care about the future of our country.
I also hope this has provided you with new tools for political analysis and has contributed to fostering a less divisive debate—one that is not automatically skewed to the left by default. A debate that does not unjustifiably or undeservedly grant the political center to them in our country, which is a centrist nation.
In doing so, we can help Colombia regain the course that once led it to its best moment, thereby avoiding a dramatic crisis in the coming years—or worse, a long, painful, and senseless decline that would harm the lives and well-being of millions of Colombians, both today and in the future.
With that, we close out both this episode and the year. It has been a true pleasure to share these ideas and reflections with you in the pursuit of a better Colombia:
A freer, more democratic, safer, and more prosperous Colombia, with a government under the rule of law as strong as possible, enforcing and upholding the law.
A fairer Colombia, with greater equality before the law and more equality of opportunity—which necessarily means more and better opportunities for all.
A more united, optimistic Colombia, with more patriotism—patriotism that is simply love for one’s country, without diminishing others—and with stronger and better protections for the most vulnerable.
A more united and optimistic Colombia, with a deeper sense of patriotism—patriotism that is simply love for one’s country, without diminishing others—and with stronger and better protections for the most vulnerable.
I’ll see you in the next episode.
Once again, I deeply thank you for your time and attention, both to this episode and to this project. I wish you all, your families, and your loved ones a very Merry Christmas and a prosperous New Year!
© Jorge Enrique Gómez Pardo, All Rights Reserved, 2024.
The expression “moral courage” is one I borrow from the new leader of the British Conservative Party, Kemi Badenoch. This expression perfectly encapsulates what we stand here: standing courageously for what is right in light of the ideals, principles, and values that uphold and strengthen freedom and democracy. I came across it in a very insightful interview recently conducted by Bari Weiss, the director of The Free Press, for her podcast Honestly, which you can find below:
Former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez (center-right) governed Colombia from 2002 to 2010.